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The rapid spread of the Coronavirus (COVID-19)1 confronts policy makers with the problem
of measuring the effectiveness of containment strategies and the need to balance public health
considerations with the economic costs of a persistent lockdown. We introduce a modified epidemic
model, the controlled-SIR model, in which the disease reproduction rate evolves dynamically in
response to political and societal reactions. An analytic solution is presented. The model reproduces
official COVID-19 cases counts of a large number of regions and countries that surpassed the peak
of the outbreak. A single unbiased feedback parameter is extracted from field data and used to
formulate an index that measures the efficiency of containment policies (the CEI index). CEI values
for a range of countries are given. For two variants of the controlled-SIR model, detailed estimates
of the total medical and socio-economic costs are evaluated over the entire course of the epidemic.
Costs comprise medical care cost, the economic cost of social distancing, as well as the economic
value of lives saved. Under plausible parameters, strict measures fare better than a hands-off policy.
Strategies based on actual case numbers lead to substantially higher total costs than strategies based
on the overall history of the epidemic.
In March 2020 the World Health Organization (WHO)
declared the Coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak a pan-
demic1. In response to the growth of infections and in
particular to the exponential increase in deaths2, a large
number of countries have been put under lockdown, with
a considerable and potentially far reaching toll on eco-
nomic activities3. In this situation it is paramount to
provide scientists, the general public and policy makers
with reliable estimates of both the efficiency of contain-
ment measures and the overall costs resulting from alter-
native strategies.
The societal and political response to a major out-
break like COVID-19 is highly dynamic, changing often
rapidly with increasing case numbers. We propose to
model the feedback of spontaneous societal and political
reactions by a standard epidemic model that is modified
in one key point: the reproduction rate of the virus is
not constant, but evolves over time alongside with the
disease in a way that leads to a ‘flattening of the curve’4.
The basis of our investigation is the SIR (Susceptible, In-
fected, Recovered) model, which describes the evolution
of a contagious disease for which immunity is substan-
tially longer than the time-scale of the outbreak5. A
negative feedback-loop between the severity of the out-
break and the reproduction factor g0 is then introduced.
As a function of the control strength α, which unites the
effect of individual, social and political reactions to dis-
ease spreading, either an uncontrolled epidemic (α = 0),
or a strongly contained outbreak is described, as illus-
trated in Fig. 1a. The model is validated using publicly
available COVID-19 case counts from an extended range
of countries and regions. We provide evidence for data
collapse when the case counts of distinct outbreaks are
rescaled with regard to their peak values. A comprehen-
sive theoretical description based on an analytic solution
of the controlled-SIR model is given. One finds substan-
tial differences in the country-specific intrinsic reproduc-
tion factor and its doubling time. The controlled-SIR
model allows in addition to formulate an unbiased bench-
mark for the effectiveness of containment measures, the
containment efficiency index (CEI).
The controlled-SIR model is thoroughly embedded in
epidemiology modeling. Early on, the study of the dy-
namics of measles epidemics6 has shown that human be-
havior needs to be taken into account7,8. In this re-
gard, a range of extensions to the underlying SIR model
have been proposed in the past, such as including the
effect of vaccination, contact-frequency reduction and
quarantine9, human mobility10, self-isolation11, the ef-
fects of social and geographic networks12, and the influ-
ence of explicit feedback loops13. For an in-depth de-
scription, epidemiology models need to cover a range of
aspects14, which prevents in general the possibility of an
explicit analytic handling.
Political containment efforts, such as social-distancing
measures, are implicitly included in the controlled-SIR
model. We therefore use this model to estimate the over-
all economic and health-related costs associated with dis-
tinct containment strategies, accumulated over the entire
course of an epidemic. This approach extends classical
studies of the economic aspects of controlling contagious
diseases. A central question is here the weighting of the
economic costs of a disease transmission against the cost
of treatment, and the loss of life, where a framework has
been established15,16. For the value of life, the statisti-
cal approach attributes the monetary value of an avoided
premature death17–19. This framework has been applied
to the Corona pandemic in several recent contributions
in which the evolution of the epidemic has generally been
taken as exogenous20 relying on estimates for the infec-
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2tion21, and case fatality rates22,23. In this context, fur-
ther studies have also discussed the relative effectiveness
of control measures21,24, and the possible future course
of the disease25.
Controlled-SIR Model
At a given time t we denote with S = S(t) the fraction
of susceptible (non-affected) individuals, with I = I(t)
the fraction of the population that is currently ill (active
cases), and with R = R(t) the fraction of recovered or
deceased individuals. Normalization demands S+I+R =
1 at all times. The continuous-time SIR model26
τ S˙ = −gSI, τ I˙ = (gS − 1)I, τR˙ = I (1)
describes an isolated epidemic outbreak characterized by
a timescale τ and a reproduction factor g. Social and po-
litical reactions reduce the reproduction factor below its
intrinsic (medical disease-growth) value, g0. This func-
tionality can be described by
g =
g0
1 + αX
, X = 1− S . (2)
The reaction to the epidemic is assumed to be triggered
by the total fractional case count X (i.e. the sum of ac-
tive, recovered and deceased cases), with α encoding the
reaction strength. We note that empirical data on the
reaction of governments and the severity of the outbreak
suggest that this relation holds27. Further below we will
examine in addition strategies that are based, as an alter-
native framework, on the fraction of actual active cases,
I.
The inverse functionality in equation (2) captures the
notion that it becomes progressively harder to reduce g
when increasing social distancing. Reducing g only some-
what is comparatively easy, a suppression by several or-
ders of magnitude requires, in contrast, a near to total
lockdown. We denote equation (1) together with (2) the
controlled-SIR model. Key to our investigation is the ob-
servation that one can integrate the controlled-SIR model
analytically, as shown in the Methods section, to obtain
the phase-space relation
I =
α+ g0
g0
X +
1 + α
g0
log(1−X) . (3)
This relation, which we denote the ‘XI representation’, is
manifestly independent of the time scale τ .
The medical peak load Ipeak of actual infected cases
is reached at a total fractional case count X = Xpeak,
which is given by
gS = 1, Xpeak =
g0 − 1
g0 + α
, (4)
For α = 0 (no control), Xpeak reduces to the well-known
result Xpeak = (g0 − 1)/g0. Ipeak is then obtained from
equations (3) and (4),
Ipeak =
g0 − 1
g0
+
1 + α
g0
log
(
1 + α
g0 + α
)
. (5)
For α = 0, Ipeak is usually called the ’herd immunity
point’. The XI representation can be parameterized con-
sequently either by g0 and α, as in equation (3), or in-
directly by Xpeak and Ipeak, which are measurable. In
Fig. 1a an illustration of the XI-representation is given.
For g0 = 3 (in units of the disease duration) and α = 0
one has Xpeak = 2/3 and Ipeak ≈ 0.3. The total fraction
of infected Xtot is 94%, which implies that only about
6% of the population remains unaffected. Containment
policies, α > 0, reduce these values. Fig. 1a and equation
(5) illustrate a sometimes encountered misconception re-
garding the meaning of the herd immunity point, which
we have labelled simply Ipeak. The epidemic doesn’t stop
at Ipeak since infections continue beyond this point, albeit
at a declining rate.
XI representation of COVID-19 outbreaks
Regional COVID-19 outbreaks are described by the
controlled-SIR model to an astonishing degree of accu-
racy. For the analysis presented in Fig. 1b,c we divided,
as described in the Methods section, the official case
counts by the nominal population size of the respective
region or country. Five-day centered averages are per-
formed in addition. The such obtained country- and re-
gion specific XI representations are then fitted by equa-
tion (3).
It has been widely discussed that official case counts
are affected by a range of factors, which include the avail-
ability of testing facilities and the difficulty to estimate
the relative fraction of unreported cases28,29. For ex-
ample, as of mid-March 2020, the degree of testing for
COVID-19, as measured by the proportion of the entire
population, varied by a factor of 20 between the United
States (340 tests per million) and South Korea (6100 tests
per million)30. The true incidence might be, according
to some estimates31 higher by up-to a factor of ten than
the numbers reported in the official statistics as positive.
Since in the XI representation the number cases per pop-
ulation enters, scaling both I and X with a constant
undercounting factor can be absorbed by an appropriate
compensating renormalization of α, which is implicit in
the fits shown in Fig. 1b,c. The XI framework is in this
sense robust. Renormalization becomes however invalid
if the undercounting of infection cases changes abruptly
at a certain point during the epidemics, f.i. as a result of
substantially increased testing. We will come back to this
point further below. A fundamental change in the strat-
egy followed by the government, e.g. from laissez faire to
restrictive, would lead likewise to a change in α, which is
not captured in the current framework.
In Table I we present for a number of countries and
regions the obtained native (intrinsic) daily growth fac-
tors g0 and the corresponding doubling times τ2, where
τ2 = log(2)/ log(g0) defines the time in days needed to
double the value of g0.
For a robustness check we evaluated the parameters
of the controlled-SIR model assuming that only a frac-
tion f of the nominal population of the country or region
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FIG. 1. XI representation of COVID-19 outbreaks. a, Model illustration. The closed expression I = I(X) of actual
infected cases I as a function of total infected cases X, as given by equation (3), is shown for two cases: α = 0 (no control), red
line and α = 10 (long-term control), blue line for an intrinsic reproduction factor (in units of the disease duration) of g0 = 3.
The number of infections is maximal at Ipeak (open circle), after starting at X = I = 0, with the epidemic ending when the
number of actual cases drops again to zero. At this point the number of infected reaches Xtot. The peak of the uncontrolled
case (α = 0), Xpeak = 2/3, is sometimes called the ‘herd immunity’ point. The final fraction of infected is Xtot = 0.94. b,
Model validation for a choice of four countries/regions. The model (lines) fits the five-day centered averages of COVID-19 case
counts well. For South Korea data till March 10 (2020) has been used for the XI-fit, at which point a transition from long-term
overall control to the tracking of individuals is observable. c, Data collapse shown for ten countries/regions. Rescaling with the
peak values Xpeak and Ipeak, obtained from the XI fit, maps COVID-19 case counts approximately onto a universal inverted
parabola. d, Robustness test. The often strong daily fluctuations are smoothed by n-day centered averages. Shown are the
Bergamo data (dots, n = 5) and XI-fits to n = 1 (no average), n = 5 and n = 7. Convergence of the XI-representation is
observed.
4in question could be potentially infected, possibly due
to the presence of social or geographical barriers to the
disease spreading. Only marginal differences were found
for f = 1/3. The data presented in Table I suggest that
there is a substantial spread in the country-specific intrin-
sic doubling times τ2. A direct connection between the
severeness of an outbreak and the length of the respective
doubling time is not evident. Regarding the US, which
did not yet pass the peak for the most part, the analysis
is preliminary. For New York City, an early estimate of
the CEI value indicates a value of approximatively 0.96,
below the one of Bergamo.
Data collapse for COVID-19
Given that the XI representation is determined solely
by two quantities, Xpeak and Ipeak, universal data col-
lapse can be attained by plotting field data normalized
with regard to the respective peak values, viz by plot-
ting I/Ipeak as a function of X/Xpeak. It is remarkable,
to which degree the country- and region specific official
case counts coincide in relative units, see Fig. 1c. It im-
plies that the controlled-SIR model constitutes a faithful
phase-space representation of epidemic spreading subject
to socio-political containment efforts.
Containment efficiency index
The control strength α enters the reproduction factor as
αX, see equation (2). Data collapse suggest that re-
gional and country-wise data is comparable on a relative
basis. From αX = (αXpeak)(X/Xpeak) it follows that
αX = α(g0− 1)/(g0 +α) is a quantity that measures the
combined efficiency of socio-political efforts to contain
an outbreak. Dividing by g0 − 1 results in a normalized
TABLE I. COVID-19 containment efficiency index. For
selected countries, key COVID-19 parameters, as extracted
from the respective official case counts. Given is the intrinsic
daily growth factor g0, the doubling time τ2 = log(2)/ log(g0)
in days, and the containment efficiency index CEI = α/(g0 +
α).
location g0 τ2 CEI
Italy ITA 1.17 4.4 0.991
Iceland ISL 1.19 4.0 0.983
Bergamo ITA 1.20 3.8 0.972
Roma ITA 1.20 3.8 0.998
Germany DEU 1.21 3.6 0.995
United States USA 1.22 3.5 0.994
Spain ESP 1.23 3.3 0.990
Luxembourg LUX 1.28 2.8 0.988
Austria AUT 1.30 2.6 0.997
Israel ISR 1.30 2.6 0.997
Australia AUS 1.32 2.5 0.999
South Korea KOR 1.46 1.8 1.000
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FIG. 2. Control of epidemic peak. a, Shown is the time-
line of actual infected cases during an epidemic outbreak with
an intrinsic reproduction factor (in units of the disease du-
ration) of ρ0 = 3.0, which is close to COVID-19 estimates
32.
The simulation is obtained by iterating equation (8), with one
iteration corresponding to two weeks, taken as the average du-
ration of the illness. Short-term control, which responds to
the actual number of cases, see equation (7), is able to reduce
the peak strain on the hospital system, but only by prolonging
substantially the overall duration. Long-term control, which
takes the entire history of the outbreak into account, is able
to reduce both the peak and the duration of the epidemic. b,
Increasing testing by a factor two (arrow), reduces the under-
counting factor which increases, in turn, the effective response
strength for both, the peak number of actual cases and the
duration of the outbreak.
index, the ‘Containment Efficiency Index’ (CEI):
CEI =
αXpeak
g0 − 1 =
α
g0 + α
, (6)
with CEI ∈ [0, 1]. The index is unbiased, being based
solely on case count statistics, and not on additional
socio-political quantifiers. Our estimates are given in Ta-
ble I. The values for the evaluated regions/ countries are
consistently high, close to unity, the upper bound, in-
dicating that the near-to-total lockdown policies imple-
mented by most countries has been effective in containing
the spread of COVID-19. A somewhat reduced CEI value
is found for the particularly strongly affected Italian re-
gion of Bergamo. For South Korea the CEI is so high
that its deviation from unity cannot be measured with
confidence.
Long-term vs. short-term control
So far, in equation (2) it was assumed that society and
5policy makers react to the total case count of infected X.
This reaction pattern, which one may denote as ‘long-
term control’, describes field data well. It is nevertheless
of interest to examine an alternative, short-term control:
g =
{
g0/(1 + αI) (short-term)
g0/(1 + αX) (long-term)
(7)
For short-term control the relevant yardstick is given by
the actual case number of infected I. The SIR model with
short-term control cannot be analytically integrated, in
contrast to the long-term controlled SIR model. It is
therefore convenient to use the discrete-time controlled-
SIR model,
It+1 = ρtIt(1−Xt), Xt =
∞∑
k=0
It−k , (8)
for numerical simulations. The reproduction factor ρt is
given by the discrete-time version of equation (7), with
a ρ0 that is appropriate for the time period associated
with one transition in equation (8). Fig. 2 illustrates the
capability of short-term and long-term reaction policies
to contain an epidemic. While both strategies are able
to lower the peak of the outbreak with respect to the un-
controlled (α = 0) case, the disease will become close to
endemic when the reaction is based on the actual num-
ber of cases, It, and not on the overall history of the
outbreak.
Also included in the lower panel of Fig. 2 is a protocol
simulating an increase of testing by a factor of two. Here
α = 400 has been used as the starting reaction strength,
which increases by a factor of two when testing reduces
the undercounting ratio by one half. One observes that
long-term control is robust, in the sense that increased
testing contributes proportionally to the containment of
the outbreak. Strategies reacting to daily case number
are in contrast likely to produce an endemic state.
The framework developed here, equations (1) and (2),
describes mass control strategies, which are necessary
when overly large case number do not allow to track indi-
vidual infections. The framework is not applicable once
infection rates are reduced to controllable levels by social
distancing measures. The horizontal ’tail’ evident in the
data from South Korea in Fig. 1b can be taken as evi-
dence of such a shift from long-term mass control to the
tracking of individual cases.
Costs of controlling the COVID-19 pandemic
As shown above, the controlled-SIR model allows for a
faithful modeling of the entire course of an outbreak. We
apply it now to investigate how distinct policies and so-
cietal reaction patterns, as embedded in the parameter
α, influence the overall costs of the epidemic. This is
an inter-temporal approach since the cost of restrictions
today to public life (lockdowns, closure of schools, etc.)
must be set against future gains in terms of lower infec-
tions (less intensive hospital care, fewer deaths). Four
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FIG. 3. Cost of epidemic control strategies. Shown are
the costs in terms of GDPp.c. for long-term and short-term
control, as defined by equation (7), both as a function of α and
the CEI values (6), as indicated by the additional axis at the
bottom. Given are the costs incurring from social distancing,
equation (9) with m = 0.25 (lower panel), the pure medical
costs with value of life costs (middle panel) and the sum of
social and medical costs (upper panel). It is assumed that the
containment policy switches from mass control to individual
tracking when the fraction of actual cases It drops below a
threshold of Imin = 10
−5. The starting I0 = 2 · 10−5.
elements dominate the cost structure: (i) The working
time lost due to an infection, (ii) the direct medical costs
of infections, (iii) the value of life costs, and (iv) the cost
related to ‘social distancing’. The first three are med-
ical or health-related. All costs can be scaled in terms
of GDP per capita (GDPp.c.). This makes our analysis
applicable not only to the US, but to most countries with
similar GDPp.c., e.g. most OECD countries.
Overall cost estimates
The costs estimates, which are given in detail in the Sup-
plementary Information, can be performed disregarding
discounting. With market interest rates close to zero and
the comparatively short time period over which the epi-
demic plays out, a social discount rate between 3% and
5% would make little difference over the course of one
year33.
Total health costs Cmedical incurring over the duration
of the epidemic are proportional to the overall fraction
Xtot = Xt→∞ of infected, with a factor of proportionality
k. We hence have Cmedical = kXtot. We estimate k ≈
0.305 in terms of GDPp.c. when all three contributions
(working-time lost, direct medical cost, value of life) are
taken into account, and k ≈ 0.14 when value of life costs
are omitted.
The economic costs induced by social-distancing mea-
sures, Csocial, depend in a non-linear way on the evolu-
6tion of new cases (short-term control) or the percentage
of the population infected (long-term control). To be
specific, we posit that the reduction of economic activity
is percentage-wise directly proportional to the reduction
in the reproduction factor, viz to (1− ρt/ρ0):
Csocial =
∑
It>Imin
cst, c
s
t = m
[
1− ρt
ρ0
]
2
52
, (9)
where 2/52 is the per year fraction of 2-week quarantine
period, and the epidemic is considered to have stopped
when the fraction of new infections It falls below a min-
imal value Imin. As detailed out in the Supplementary
Information, a comprehensive analysis yields m ≈ 0.3
in terms of GDPp.c.. Note that the ansatz equation (9)
holds only when mass control is operative, viz when large
case numbers do not allow the tracking of individual in-
fections.
Once k and m are known, one can compare the to-
tal costs incurring as the result of distinct polices by
computing the sum of future costs for different values
for α in equation (2). This is illustrated in Fig. 3 with
the value of life costs included (k = 0.305), and in Ex-
tended Data Fig. 3, without value of life costs (k = 0.14).
Given are the total cumulative costs for the two strate-
gies considered, long-term and short-term control, both
as a function of the respective implementation strength,
as expressed by the value of α.
The middle panel of Fig. 3 shows that a society focused
on short-term successes will incur substantially higher
medical costs, because restrictions are relaxed soon after
the peak. By contrast, if policy (and individual behav-
ior) is influenced by the total number of all cases experi-
enced so far, restrictions will not be relaxed prematurely
and the medical costs will be lower for all values of α.
The bottom panel shows the social distancing costs as a
fraction of GDPp.c., which represent a more complicated
trade-off between the severity of the restrictions and the
time they need to be maintained. If neither policy, nor
individuals react to the spread of the disease (α = 0) the
epidemic will take its course and costs are solely med-
ical. This changes as soon as society reacts, i.e. as α
increases. Social distancing costs increase initially (i.e.
for small values of α), somewhat stronger for the long-
term than for the short-term reaction framework. The
situation reverses for higher values of α with α ≈ 30 be-
ing the turning point. From there on, the distancing cost
from a long-term based reaction falls below that of the
short-term strategy. The sum of the two costs is shown
in the uppermost panel. For large values of α, short-term
policies result in systematically higher costs.
Discussion
The total costs of competing containment strategies can
be estimated if the feedback of socio-political measures
can be modeled. For this program to be carried out
one needs two ingredients, (i) a validated epidemiological
model and (ii) a procedure relating the success of con-
tainment efforts, in terms of model parameters, to the
economic costs generated by the measures. Regarding
the first aspect, we studied the controlled-SIR model and
showed that COVID-19 outbreaks follow the phase-space
trajectory, denoted the XI representation, predicted by
the analytic solution. The same holds for the 2015 MERS
outbreak in South Korea, as shown in Extended Data
Fig. 1b. We extracted for a number of countries and re-
gions accurate estimates for the intrinsic doubling times
and found that they are not correlated to the severity of
the outbreak.
Regarding the second aspect, we proposed that a
percentage-wise corresponding principle between the
achieved reduction in the infection rate and economic
slowdown, equation (9), is able to establish the required
link between epidemiology, political actions and eco-
nomic consequences. Health-related costs, which are re-
lated to official case counts, are in contrast comparatively
easier to estimate.
A non-trivial outcome of our study is that strong sup-
pression strategies lead to lower total costs than taking
no action, when containment efforts are not relaxed with
falling infection rates. A short-term control approach of
softening containment with falling numbers of new cases
is likely to lead to a prolonged endemic period. With re-
gard to the ‘exit strategy’ discussion, these findings imply
that social distancing provisions need to be replaced by
measures with comparative containment power. A prime
candidate is in this regard to ramp up testing capabil-
ities to historically unprecedented levels, several orders
of magnitude above pre-Corona levels. The epidemic can
be contained when most new cases can be tracked, as im-
plicitly expressed by the factor α. This strategy can be
implemented once infection rates are reduced to control-
lable levels by social distancing measures. Containment
would benefit if the social or physical separation of the
‘endangered’ part of the population from the ‘not endan-
gered’ would be organized in addition on a country-wide
level, as suggested by community-epidemiology. With
this set of actions the vaccine-free period can be bridged.
As a last note, there is a sometimes voiced misconcep-
tion regarding the meaning of the herd immunity point,
which occurs for an infection factor of three when 66%
of the population is infected. Beyond the herd immunity
point, the infected-case counts remain elevated for a con-
siderable time. The outbreak stops completely only once
94% of the population has been infected, as illustrated
in Fig. 1a. The view that the epidemic is essentially over
once the herd immunity point is reached is erroneous.
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Data collection and handling
Data has been accessed April 12 (2020) via the public
COVID-19 Github repository of the John Hopkins Cen-
ter of Systems Science and Engineering34. Preprocessing
was kept minimal, comprising only a basic smoothing
with sliding averages. If not stated otherwise, a five time
centered average (two days before/after plus current day)
has been used. Robustness checks with one, three and
seven days were performed, as shown in Fig. 1d. Frac-
tional case counts are obtained by dividing the raw num-
ber by the respective population size. For the case of
South Korea, the XI-analysis was performed using the
initial outbreak, up to March 10 (2020). China has been
ommitted in view of the change in case count methodolgy
mid February 2020.
The variable I represents in the SIR model the fraction
of the population that is infectious. For the COVID-19
data, we used instead an XI-representation for which the
number of new daily cases is plotted against the total
case count. This procedure is admissible as long as the
relative duration of the infectious period does not change.
Fitting procedure
Field data is crowded at low levels of X and I in the XI
representation. A fitting routine that takes the range
X ∈ [0, Xtot] uniformly into account is attained when
minimizing the weighed loss function
U =
∑
t
ut
(
I
(data)
t − I(theory)(X(data)t )
)2
. (10)
For the weight we used ut = X
(data)
t −X(data)t−1 = I(data)t ,
which satisfies the sum-rule
∑
t ut = Xtot. With equa-
tion (10) it becomes irrelevant where the timeline of field
data is truncated, both at the start or at the end. Adding
a large number of null measurements after the epidemic
stopped would not alter the result. Numerically the min-
imum of U as a function of g0 and α is evaluated.
Modeling field data as uncontrolled outbreaks
It is of interest to examine to which degree official case
statistics could be modeled using an uncontrolled model,
α = 0. For this purpose it is necessary to assume that the
epidemics stops on its own, which implies that one needs
to normalize the official case counts not with respect to
the actual population, but with respect to a fictitious
population size N . In this view the outbreak starts and
ends in a socially or geographically restricted community.
The results obtained when optimizing N is included in
Extended Data Fig. 1a. On first sight, the α = 0 curve
tracks the field data. Note however the very small effec-
tive population sizes, which are found to be 36 thousands
for the case of Austria. Alternative one may adjust g0
by hand during the course of an epidemic, as it is often
done when modeling field data.
Analytic solution of the controlled-SIR model
Starting with the expression for the long-term control,
equation (2), one can integrate the controlled-SIR model
equation (1) to obtain a functional relation between S
and I. Integrating I˙/S˙, viz
dI = −dS + 1
g(S)S
dS = −dS + 1
g0
1 + α(1− S)
S
dS ,
yields
I = −
(
α
g0
+ 1
)
S +
1 + α
g0
log(S) + c , (11)
where the integration constant c is given by the condition
I(S = 1) = 0. Substituting S = 1 − X one obtains
consequently the XI-representation equation (3). The
analogous result for α = 0 has been derived earlier35. The
number of actual cases, I, vanishes both when X = 0, the
starting point of the outbreak, and when the epidemic
stops. The overall number of cases, Xtot, is obtained
consequently by the non-trivial root Xtot of equation (3),
as illustrated in Fig. 1a. As a side remark, we mention
that the XI representation allows us to reduce equation
(1) to
τ S˙ =
(
gS − 1)(α+ g0
g0
(1− S) + 1 + α
g0
log(S)
)
, (12)
which is one dimensional. Integrating equation (12) with
g = g(S) yields S = S(t), from which I(t) follows via
τ I˙ =
(
gS − 1)I and R(t) from the normalization condi-
tion S + I +R = 1.
Large control limit of the XI representation
Expanding equation (3) in X, which becomes small when
α 1, one obtains
I =
1 + α
2g0
X
[
2
g0 − 1
1 + α
−X
]
+O(X3) , (13)
which makes clear that the phase-space trajectory be-
comes an inverted parabola when infection fractions are
small. As a consequence one finds
I ≈ g0 − 1
g0
X +O(X2) , (14)
which shows that the slope dI/dX = (g0 − 1)/g0 at
X → 0 is independent of α and of the normalization
procedure used for I and X. The first result was to
be expected, as α incorporates the reaction to the out-
break, which implies that α contributes only to higher or-
der. The natural daily growth factor g0 is hence uniquely
determined, modulo the noise inherent in field data, by
measuring the slope of the daily case numbers with re-
spect to the cumulative case count.
From equation (13) one obtains
Xtot
∣∣
α1 ≈ 2
g0 − 1
α
(15)
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for the total number of infected Xtot in the large-control
limit. In analogy one finds
Ipeak
∣∣
α1 ≈
(g0 − 1)2
g0α
, Xtot ≈ 2g0
g0 − 1 Ipeak (16)
from equation (3), and in comparison with equation (15).
Data availability
The COVID-19 data examined is publicly accessible via
the COVID-19 Github repository of the John Hopkins
Center of Systems Science and Engineering
https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19.
Data for the 2015 MERS outbreak in South Korea is
publicly available from the archive of the World Health
organization (WHO),
https://www.who.int/csr/disease/coronavirus
infections/archive-cases/en/.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Detailed costs of controlling the COVID-19
pandemic
In what follows we present a detailed estimation of
the costs of controlling the COVID-19 pandemic given
in GDP per capita (GDPp.c.). We assume that four ele-
ments dominate the cost structure: (i) The working time
lost due to an infection, (ii) the direct medical costs of
infections, (iii) the value of life costs, and (iv) the cost
related to ‘social distancing’. The first three are medical
or health-related.
Health costs, loss of working time
A first direct impact of a wave of infections is that a
fraction of the population cannot work. Based on the Di-
amond Princess data36, where the entire population was
tested, we estimate that only half of the infected develop
symptoms that require them to stay home for a one- to
two-week period and an additional two-week period until
they are no longer contagious. About 20% of the to-
tal population (or 40% of those with symptoms) develop
stronger symptoms requiring one additional period of ab-
sence from work23. To be conservative, we assume that
there are no severe cases or deaths among the working
age. This results in a reduction in the work force per
year (52 weeks) of around (0.3× 2 + 0.2× 3)× (2/52) =
2.4/52 = 5 percent, for every 1% of the population in-
fected.
Medical costs, treatment, hospitalization
There are no rigorous studies yet of the costs of treat-
ment for the COVID-19, but it is estimated that about
20%37 of the infected individuals require some sort of
hospitalization, with around 5% needing intensive care
and roughly 1% dying36. As a comparison, we note that
an average influenza season leads to an hospitalization of
about 0.12% of the US population38; and one fourth of
them require intensive care, with one twentieth (0.13% of
all infected) dying36. Averaged over the 2010-17, of the
order of 35 thousand influenza-related deaths per year
have been registered in the US. For Germany, with a
quarter of the US population, these numbers would trans-
late into 8-9 thousands influenza deaths per year.
Intensive care with ventilation is the most costly form
of life saving in hospital care. In the US, the cost of 2
weeks of an intensive care unit is equivalent to about 1
year (100%) of GDPp.c.
39. In Germany, which might be
typical of the rest of Europe, the cost of 2 weeks of inten-
sive care appears to be somewhat lower, around 20,000
euro, or roughly 60% of GDPp.c.
40. We use the Ger-
man parameter for a conservative estimate of medical
costs. The cost of general hospitalization for 2 weeks
is assumed to be 12,000 euro, and equivalent to about
30% of GDPp.c.. It is estimated that the median time
from onset to recovery for mild cases is approximately
two weeks and 3-6 weeks for patients with severe or crit-
ical disease41. We use a conservative estimate of two
weeks of intensive care and two weeks of general hospi-
talization for severe cases. This results in a medical cost
of (0.05× 0.6 + 0.05× 0.3 + 0.15× 0.3 = 0.09), that is 9%
GDPp.c..
Value of lives lost
Third, the cost of premature death through the disease
represents the most difficult contribution to evaluate in
financial terms. We will show below that our central
results remain valid even without assigning a value to
lives lost, but since major contributions20 are based on
an evaluation of the economic value of lives lost, we show
how this point can be incorporated into our framework.
There are two ways to attribute a monetary value on a
life saved or lost. The first one, mentioned above, is based
on the concept of a Value of Statistical Life (VSL), which
is commonly used in the impact assessment of public pol-
icy which aims at lowering the probability of an avoided
premature death42. A typical application scenario for
VSL is the case when the probability of death is very low
(e.g. car accidents), but could be lowered even more (seat
belts). For COVID-19, a high-death epidemic, we prefer
a medical-based approach, which allows us to produce
conservative estimates. VSL arrives in contrast often at
much higher values, up to millions of euro or dollars43.
Putting a monetary value on lives saved is unavoidable
in medical practice that is confronted with the problem
of selecting the procedures to be used to prolong life -
a situation that arises for many patients infected by the
Coronavirus under intensive care. The literature deal-
ing with the cost of medical procedures finds a central
range of between 100,000 and 300,000 dollars per year of
life lost44,45. Given the current US GDPp.c., these values
translate into a range of 1.5 to 4 years of GDPp.c.. Cut-
ler and Richardson46 argue for a value equivalent to three
times GDPp.c.. We use the lower bound of this range for
most of our simulations for a conservative estimate of the
value of lives saved.
What remains to be determined is the number of years
lost when a Corona patient dies. We rely on the data
from the cruise ship Diamond Princess22,36 which served
almost as a laboratory, the average age at death was 76
years. Cruise passengers tend to have fewer acute health
conditions than the general population, thus rendering
the co-morbidity argument less prominent. The remain-
ing life expectancy (weighted by the difference incidence
by sex) would thus be 11 years. This implies that the
economic value of the premature deaths should be equal
to about 11 times the loss for one year of life saved (po-
tentially higher for most European countries which tend
to have a higher life expectancy). For each 1% of the
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population the value of lives lost would thus be equal to
0.01× 11× the nominal value of one year of life.
The value of life can be measured in terms of multiples
of GDPp.c., which allows to write the sum of the three
types of health or medical costs (loss of working time,
hospitalization and value of lives lost) as a linear function
of the percentage of the population infected:
cmedt = kIt
with a proportionality factor k being equal to the sum of
the three contributions. Scaling k with the GDPp.c. al-
lows for an application and comparison across countries.
Using the lower bound of the central range yields then
the following calibration of the medical costs:
(0.05 + 0.09 + 0.01× 1.5× 11)×GDPp.c. =
0.305×GDPp.c. (17)
The upper bound for the value of k would be substantially
higher: (0.05 + 0.09 + 0.01× 4× 11)×GDPp.c. = 0.58×
GDPp.c.. For the numerical calculations we will use the
conservative estimate k = 0.305 in terms of GDPp.c..
If we only consider the direct medical costs consisting
of loss of working time and hospitalization, without in-
cluding the value of lives lost, the proportionality factor
in equation (17) reduces to k = 0.14 in terms of GDPp.c..
Medical costs over the lifetime of the epidemic
The cost estimates discussed so far, cmedt , refer to the
per-period cost of the currently infected. For the total
cost over the entire endemic we need to calculate the
discounted sum of all cmedt over time. Given that a period
corresponds to about two weeks, we neglect discounting,
which would make little difference even if one uses a social
discount rate of 5% instead of using market rates (which
may be negative). The total medical costs over the course
of the endemic can be written as the simple sum of the
cost per unit of time:
Cmedical =
∑
It>Imin
cmedt = kXtot . (18)
The epidemic is considered to have stopped when the
fraction of new infections It falls below a minimal value,
Imin.
Using the conservative estimate (low value of life) k =
0.305 it is straightforward to evaluate the total cost of a
policy of not reacting at all to the spread of the disease,
which would lead in the end to Xtot = 0.94. A hands-off
policy would therefore lead to medical costs of over 28%
of GDP.
In absolute terms the cost of a policy of doing nothing
would amount to 1000 billion euro for a country like Ger-
many. For the US the sum would be closer to 5 Trillion
of dollars (25% of a GDP of 20 Trillion of dollars). As
it would not be possible to ramp up hospital capacity in
the short time given the rapid spread of the disease, the
cost would be in reality substantially higher, together
with death toll20,21. We abstract from the question of
medical capacity (limited number of hospital beds) be-
cause we assume that society would react anyway as the
virus spreads, thus limiting the peak, and, second, we
are interested in the longer term implications of different
strategies and not just in their impact on the short-term
peak.
We note that even concentrating only on the direct
medical cost and working time lost (k=0.14) a policy
of letting the epidemic run its course through the en-
tire population would lead to losses of working time and
hospital treatment of over 13% of GDP (94% of 14%).
By comparison, total health expenditure in most Euro-
pean countries amounts in normal times to about 11% of
GDP47. Even apart from ethical considerations, to avoid
or not potentially hundreds of thousands of premature
deaths, there exists thus an economic incentive to slow
the spread of the COVID-19 virus.
Given the somewhat contentious nature of the value
of lives lost, we present in the middle panel of Extended
Data Fig. 3 of the main text the medical cost estimates
(as a proportion of GDP) without including the value of
life costs (results with including the value of life costs are
shown in the main text). As shown in the figure, increas-
ing α leads to a lower medical cost because the percentage
of the population infected will be lower. The difference
between short-term and long-term control increases for
higher values of α. At these α values the medical cost
over the entire endemic would be lower because the over-
all fraction of infected population is lower. For a strongly
reactive society and policy i.e. for α  1 (and the case
of long-term control), an explicit solution for the total
health cost is given by,
Cmedical = kXtot
∣∣
α1 ≈ 2k
g0 − 1
α
(19)
which implies that the total health or medical costs are
inversely proportional to the strength of the policy reac-
tion parameter. Draconian measures from the start, i.e.
α going towards infinity reduce the medical costs to close
zero - irrespective of whether one adds the value of lives
lost. This can be seen in Fig. 3 of the main text and the
respective and Extended Data figure, where the medical
cost (over the entire epidemic) starts for α = 0 at values
close to k because without any societal reaction 94% of
the population would get infected and with increasing α
the medical costs decline monotonously.
Social distancing costs
The economic costs of imposing social distancing on
a wider population are at the core of policy discussions
and drive financial markets. As mentioned above, social
distancing can take many forms; ranging from abstaining
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from travel or restaurant meals to government interven-
tions enforcing lockdowns, quarantine, closure of schools,
etc. This cost is more difficult to estimate. However, a
rough estimate is possible if one takes into account that
most economic activity involves some social interactions.
Limiting social interaction thus necessarily reduces eco-
nomic activity. This suggests that the economic cost of
the social distancing described in equation (2) of the main
text should increase with the reduction in the transmis-
sion rate described by g.
Without any social distancing, α = 0, the economy
would not be affected by the spread of the virus. Stop-
ping all economic social interactions would bring the
economy to a halt, but the reproduction rate of the virus
would also go close to zero (Eichenbaum et al.48 make
a similar assumption). We thus posit that the (per-time
unit) social-distancing economic cost cst is proportional
to the reduction in the transmission rate. The total eco-
nomic costs Csocial can be written as the sum of cst:
Csocial =
∑
It>Imin
cst, c
s
t = m
[
1− ρt
ρ0
]
2
52
(20)
considering here the notation of the discrete-time con-
trolled SIR model (equation (8)). The key question is
the factor of proportionality, m, which links the sever-
ity of social distancing to the reduction in economic ac-
tivity. Popular attention has focused on services linked
directly to social contact. There exist indeed selected
sectors which will completely shut down under a lock-
down. However, these sectors (tourism, non-food retail,
etc.) account for a limited share of the economy (less
than 10% for most countries). Expenditure for food is
actually little affected since even under the most severe
lockdown, grocery shopping is still allowed and families
must consume more food at home as they cannot go out
to restaurants.
The manufacturing sector is less affected by social dis-
tancing than the service sector because in modern fac-
tories workers are scattered over a large factory floor,
making it relatively easy to maintain production while
maintaining the appropriate distance between workers.
Moreover, some sectors, e.g. finance, can work online with
only a limited effect on productivity. The widespread im-
pression that the entire economy stops under a lockdown
is thus not correct. The drastic measures adopted in
China illustrate this proposition: when all non-essential
social interactions were forbidden, industrial production
and retail sales fell by ’only’ 20-25%49 while the repro-
duction factor went from 3 to 0.3, a fall by a factor of
ten. Using this experience we calibrate the parameter m
at 0.25.
A reduction in the reproduction factor ρt to one tenth
its normal epidemiological value of ρ0 would thus lead to
a loss of GDP of 25% for the time period during which
the restriction or social distancing measures are in place.
This would imply that an abrupt shutdown of the econ-
omy to 25% of its capacity for 12 weeks, or 6 incubation
periods would cost about 0.25×(12/52), or about 6% of
annual GDP. A reduction of GDP by 6% would represent
a recession even deeper than the one which followed the
financial crisis of 2009. This is compatible with current
forecasts of zero GDP growth in China in 2020 (relative
to a baseline of 5-6% before the crisis). But even such
a large cost in terms of output foregone would be be-
low the medical cost arising from herd immunity. Even
apart from ethical considerations, it would thus appear
to make sense to accept a temporary shut down of parts
of the economy to avoid the huge medical costs.
A first result is thus that if one compares two extremes:
letting contagion run its course (herd immunity) or dra-
conian measures, the social costs are lower in the second
case. Small changes to the key parameters, k and m,
might change the exact values of the costs in terms of
overall magnitude, but the ranking appears robust.
We do not consider separately the fiscal cost, i.e. the
cost for the government to save millions of enterprises
from bankruptcy and ensure that workers have a replace-
ment income when they get laid off. This cost to govern-
ments is a transfer within the country from one part of
society (tax payers) to those who suffer most under the
economic crisis.
A key issue in the discussion on the economic cost of
social distancing is the question about how long these
measures need to be maintained. It is sometimes argued
that the cost of a policy of social distancing would be
unacceptably high because the measures could not be re-
laxed until the virus had been totally eradicated. How-
ever, this pessimism is not warranted by the success of
a strategy of ‘testing and tracing’ implemented in some
countries (mainly those which had experienced SARS).
Such a strategy is, of course, only possible if the starting
number of infections is low enough to allow for individual
tracing.
We thus make the assumption that when the number
of active cases falls below a certain threshold, the costly
measures of general social distance containment are no
longer needed and can be substituted by pro-active re-
peated testing coupled to quick follow-up of the remain-
ing few cases which are quarantined and whose contacts
are quickly traced. In this case the resulting economic
cost is assumed to fall away. The experience of Singapore
and Japan suggests that when the infected are less than
one per 100,000, general social distancing is no longer re-
quired (assuming mass testing has been adopted in the
meantime so that the infections can be accurately mea-
sured).
Parameter updating
The estimates on which our results are based will have to
be updated when actualized COVID-19 data is available
in the future. The WHO-China Joint Mission Report
suggests a ρ0 (g0 in the continuous-time representation)
per infected of 2−2.541 (in units of the disease duration),
while we use the figures from Liu et al.32, who predict a
reproduction factor of around three. The numbers for
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the forecast of health costs are derived in part from the
Diamond Princess data36, for which the population was
comparatively healthy. The statistics for symptoms re-
quiring the absence from work may therefore in reality
be somewhat higher. The hospitalization and mortality
rate are estimates with a substantial uncertainty, due to
the high numbers of unregistered and untested infections.
Early studies based on official data from China50,51 esti-
mated that the number of actual infections may be be-
tween 10 to 20 times higher than the number of detected
infections. However, first sample test in e.g. Austria sug-
gest only a factor of 352. Leaving possibly lower, but still
substantial true hospitalization and mortality rates for
COVID-19. One of our main goals has therefore been
the introduction of a generic framework, which can be
updated by future advances in the accuracy of estimates
while still presenting specific results with the data avail-
able at this time.
Relation to further studies
A range of determining factors have been examined for
the ongoing COVID-19 epidemic, in particular the effect
of quarantine53 and that community-level social distanc-
ing may be more important than the social distancing of
individuals54. An agent-based model for Australia found,
in this regard, that school closures may not be decisive55.
Microsimulation models suggest, on the other hand, that
a substantial range of non-pharmaceutical interventions
are needed for an effective containment of the COVID-19
outbreak21.
We also note that there haven’t been attempts to de-
rive disease transmission rates from economic principles
of behavior48, which would allow to measure the cost
of the Corona pandemic under different policy settings.
Another strand of the literature takes the pandemic as
given, and as the basis for scenarios for the economic
impact and for the financial-market volatility56–58.
